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 INTELLECTUAL DIVERSITY IN THE LEGAL ACADEMY 
NICHOLAS QUINN ROSENKRANZ* 
Elite law faculties are overwhelmingly liberal. Jim Lindgren 
has proven the point empirically.1 I will just add my impressions 
from Georgetown Law School to reinforce the point. We are a 
faculty of 120,2 and, to my knowledge, the number of professors 
who are openly conservative, or libertarian, or Republican or, in 
any sense, to the right of the American center, is three—three out 
of 120. There are more conservatives on the nine-member United 
States Supreme Court than there are on this 120-member faculty. 
Moreover, the ideological median of the other 117 seems to lie 
not just left of center, but closer to the left edge of the Democratic 
Party. 3 Many are further left than that. 
But at least there are three. And the good news is that this 
number has tripled in the last decade. The bad news, though, is 
that, at Georgetown, the consensus seems to be that three is 
plenty—and perhaps even one or two too many. 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University; Senior Fellow in Constitutional Stud-
ies, Cato Institute. Yale University, B.A. 1992, J.D. 1999. Thanks to Nita A. Farahany. 
And thanks, also, to Stephanie Freudenberg for first-rate research assistance.  
 This essay was adapted from panel remarks given at the Harvard Federalist Socie-
ty’s conference on “Intellectual Diversity and the Legal Academy” held on April 5, 
2013, at the Harvard Law School in Cambridge, Massachusetts. For an audio and 
video recording of the complete conference, please visit the Harvard Federalist Soci-
ety’s website. Intellectual Diversity Conference, HARVARD FEDERALIST SOCIETY, 
http://www3.law.harvard.edu/orgs/fedsoc/intellectual-diversity-conference/ (last 
visited Nov. 26, 2013).  
1. James Lindgren, Professor of Law, Nw. Univ. Law Sch., Remarks on Panel I:
Problem: is there a lack of intellectual diversity in law school faculties? at the Har-
vard Federalist Society’s Intellectual Diversity Conference (Apr. 5, 2013), available at 
http://www3.law.harvard.edu/orgs/fedsoc/intellectual-diversity-conference/. 
2. This list includes 106 full or associate professors, twelve professors of legal
research and writing, and two graduate programs faculty. Georgetown Law Fac-
ulty List (Apr. 2013) (on file with Georgetown Law Dean’s Office). 
3. Cf. Lindgren, supra note 1.
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These numbers are stark, but they are not unusual; this ratio 
actually seems fairly typical of most elite law schools. This lop-
sidedness would be a shame in any academic department.4 But 
it is a particularly ironic sort of shame at a law school. After all, 
it is a fundamental axiom of American law that the best way to 
get to truth is through the clash of zealous advocates on both 
sides. All of these law professors have, in theory, dedicated 
their lives to the study of this axiomatically adversarial system. 
And yet, at most of these schools, on most of the important is-
sues of the day, one side of the debate is dramatically un-
derrepresented, or not represented at all. 
One result, unfortunately, is a certain lack of rigor. To be 
blunt, a kind of intellectual laziness can set in when everyone 
agrees. Faculty workshops fail to challenge basic premises. 
Scholarship becomes unreflective and imprecise. 
Worse yet, this intellectual homogeneity impairs analysis of 
law in progress—law as it unfolds out in the world. Analyzing 
and predicting actual American law would seem to be an im-
portant aspect of the job. After all, the country would like to be 
able to turn to these elite faculties for wisdom and insight 
about contemporary legal controversies. But because elite 
American faculties are so far to the left of the American judici-
ary, these faculties can be startlingly poor at analyzing the ac-
tual practice of American law. 
Three recent examples illustrate this point. First, consider 
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc.5 At the 
time the case was filed, many universities were restricting mili-
tary recruiters’ access to campus, to protest the military’s poli-
cy on homosexuality.6 Congress responded with the Solomon 
4. These lopsided ratios exist, by the way, throughout elite universities; it is not
just a law school problem. In 2008, the number of Yale professors who gave money 
to the John McCain campaign was five. That is, five from the entire university—all 
of Yale. From Yale Law School, it was one (and that person no longer teaches at Yale 
Law School). Margy Slattery, Eli profs show Obama support in dollars, YALE DAILY 
NEWS, Nov. 4, 2008, http://yaledailynews.com/blog/2008/11/04/eli-profs-show-
obama-support-in-dollars/ (reporting that five Yale University professors gave 
money to the John McCain campaign, and that Professor Tom Merrill was the only 
professor from Yale Law School to give money to the John McCain campaign). 
5. 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
6. See William J. Clinton, Remarks Announcing the New Policy on Gays and Les-
bians in the Military (July 19, 1993), in 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1369, 1372. 
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Amendment, which withheld certain federal funds from col-
leges and universities that did so.7 In Rumsfeld, many top law 
schools and law faculties argued that the Solomon Amendment 
was unconstitutional.8 When Georgetown’s faculty decided to 
join them,9 I was new at the law school and hesitant to pick a 
fight. Still, I did ask to meet with one of the champions of this 
project at Georgetown. Over coffee, I told her that I thought we 
were making a mistake. 
She quickly assured me that she understood completely: Ob-
viously, I must have very strong and religiously motivated ob-
jections to homosexuality. I said no, actually, I do not; and in 
fact I am in favor of gays in the military as a matter of policy. I 
explained to her that what I object to is an incoherent legal argu-
ment. The argument against the Solomon Amendment made no 
sense, I said, and it was embarrassing for the Georgetown fac-
ulty to endorse it. 
She had not heard that before; apparently, no one at 
Georgetown had raised any doubts about the legal merits of 
the position. Indeed, the notion that our policy preference 
might be inconsistent with constitutional law seemed unfath-
omable to her. And so, she must have found it equally unfath-
omable when the Supreme Court rejected the academy’s chal-
lenge and upheld the Solomon Amendment—eight to zero.10 
All of these great minds of Stanford and Georgetown and New 
York University and so forth11 garnered not a single vote—not 
7. See 10 U.S.C. § 983 (Supp. IV 2001–05) (version considered by the Court in
Rumsfeld). 
8. 547 U.S. at 52, 70 (Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR) “is an
association of law schools and law faculties”). See Brief for Respondents, Rumsfeld, 
547 U.S. 47 (No. 04-1152); Caitlin Daniel-McCarter, Homophobia Through the First 
Amendment: A Critique of FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 10 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 199, 244 n.66 
(2006)) (listing law schools and faculties that were public members of FAIR). See 
also Burt v. Rumsfeld, 322 F. Supp. 2d 189 (D. Conn. 2004) (separate case in which 
Yale Law School faculty challenged Solomon Amendment); Brief for Columbia 
University et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 20–24, Rumsfeld, 547 
U.S. 47 (No. 04-1152) (amici are Columbia University, Cornell University, Harvard 
University, New York University, the University of Chicago, the University of 
Pennsylvania, and Yale University). 
9. See generally Brief for Respondents, supra note 8.
10. See generally Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. 47.
11. Daniel-McCarter, supra note 8, at 244 n.66 (noting that the Stanford Law
School, Georgetown University Law Center, and New York University School of 
Law faculties were members of FAIR). 
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Stevens, not Souter, not Ginsburg, nobody. What seemed a 
winning argument to the legal academy could not persuade 
even a single Justice at the Supreme Court. 
Second, consider National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius: the Affordable Care Act case.12 When my colleague Pro-
fessor Randy Barnett first crafted the Commerce Clause argu-
ment against the individual mandate,13 the Georgetown faculty 
was skeptical at best. Indeed, the typical response, at 
Georgetown and throughout the elite academy, was closer to 
ridicule.14 But the Supreme Court did not find Professor Bar-
nett’s argument to be ridiculous; it found his argument to be cor-
rect. The Supreme Court held that Congress cannot require indi-
viduals to buy insurance under the Commerce Clause.15 In the 
academy, there was utter, dumbfounded consternation. A ques-
tion that probably would have been decided 117-3 at 
Georgetown was decided 5-4 the other way at the U.S. Supreme 
Court. As so often happens, an argument that the academy con-
sidered frivolous turned out to win the day. 
Third, consider the debate over Congress’s power to legislate 
pursuant to treaty. In 1920, the Supreme Court held that if a 
12. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
13. Randy E. Barnett et al., Why the Personal Mandate to Buy Health Insurance Is
Unprecedented and Unconstitutional, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Dec. 9, 2009), 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/12/why-the-personal-mandate-to-
buy-health-insurance-is-unprecedented-and-unconstitutional; see also, e.g., Consti-
tutionality of the ’Individual Mandate’: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
112th Cong. 27–40 (2011) (statement of Randy E. Barnett); The Constitutionality of 
the Affordable Care Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 
(2011) (statement of Randy E. Barnett); Randy E. Barnett, Turning Citizens into 
Subjects: Why the Health Insurance Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 62 MERCER L. REV. 
608 (2011); Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health 
Insurance Mandate is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581 (2010). 
14. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Charlie Savage, Vindication for Challenger of Health
Care Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/27/us/ 
randy-barnetts-pet-cause-end-of-health-law-hits-supreme-court.html (“many of 
[Barnett’s] colleagues . . . dismissed the idea as ridiculous . . . .”). See also Randy E. 
Barnett, No Small Feat: Who Won the Health Care Case (and Why Did So Many Law 
Professors Miss the Boat)?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1331 (2013); David A. Hyman, Why Did 
Law Professors Misunderestimate the Lawsuits against PPACA?, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2013). 
15. See Nat’l Fed’n Ind. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593 (2012) (Roberts,
C.J.) (holding that the Commerce Clause does not authorize the individual man-
date requiring individuals to purchase health insurance); id. at 2644–50 (Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting) (same). 
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treaty commits the United States to enact some legislation, then 
Congress automatically obtains the power to enact that legisla-
tion, even if it would otherwise lack such power.16 It held, in 
other words, that Congress’s powers are not constitutionally 
fixed, but rather may be expanded by treaty. The Court offered 
no reasoning whatsoever for that proposition, but, decades lat-
er, eminent professor Louis Henkin presented the first power-
ful argument in its favor, based on constitutional drafting his-
tory. According to Professor Henkin, “The ‘necessary and 
proper’ clause originally contained expressly the power ‘to en-
force treaties,’ but it was stricken as superfluous.”17 
Henkin’s argument held sway for a generation, and forestalled 
any serious debate about the question until 2005. That year, I took 
a look at the historical documents. What I found was that Hen-
kin’s historical claim was simply false; no draft of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause ever included the words “to enforce treaties.”18 
It is not shocking that a law professor could make this error; 
scholars make errors all the time. What is shocking, though, is 
that Professor Henkin’s error managed to stand uncorrected for 
decades and to short-circuit debate for a generation. How was 
that possible? Had I parsed Madison’s notes in some terribly 
subtle way that no one else ever could? Not at all. All I did was 
flip open the right volume and check Henkin’s cite. So why 
was I the first to do it? 
Here, I think, is another pernicious symptom of intellectual 
homogeneity. Not only does it cause errors, but it allows errors 
to persist. Professor Henkin’s historical claim was very congen-
ial to the academy because its implications—greater congres-
sional power and greater scope for international law—jelled 
with the prevailing liberal orthodoxy. No one in the academy 
had a different intuition. And so, for a generation, no one in the 
academy thought to question Professor Henkin’s premises and 
check his sources. I had the opposite intuition, and so it oc-
curred to me to look. 
                                                                                                        
 16. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920). 
 17. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 408 n.105 (1st ed. 
1972). This error persisted in the second edition. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AF-
FAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 481 n.111 (2d ed. 1996). 
 18. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 1867, 1912–18 (2005). 
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Even now, after my article debunked Henkin’s historical argu-
ment, the vast majority of the liberal legal academy remains 
committed to his conclusion. Indeed, my argument to the contra-
ry—like Professor Barnett’s Affordable Care Act Commerce 
Clause argument—has been widely derided as farfetched.19 But 
the Supreme Court apparently does not find it so farfetched; it 
recently granted certiorari to reconsider this exact point.20 What-
ever the Court decides, the argument has already gotten far more 
traction than the academy expected. Again, the academy seems 
mystified about which arguments will actually work in court. 
Now, some professors may say that that they are simply not 
interested in predicting what the current Supreme Court will 
do, because, from their perspective, this Court is dominated by 
right-wing ideologues. But this view would be unsatisfactory 
even if its premise were correct. Professors may profess not to 
care what these Justices think, but students do care. Students 
would like to learn how to craft arguments that are going to 
persuade real judges—not the judges that the liberal academy 
might wish for, but the actual judges on the bench today. 
This brings me to my final point, the most important reason to 
care about intellectual diversity in law schools: Intellectual di-
versity matters to students. Without it, they are getting only half 
of a legal education. Again, at Georgetown, the ratio is three out 
of 120, and so most students will graduate without ever laying 
eyes on a Republican behind a lectern. In their three years in law 
school, they will simply never see what that looks like. How are 
19. See generally, e.g., Brief for Professors David M. Golove, Martin S. Lederman,
and John Mikhail as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Bond v. United States 
No. 12-158 (argued Nov. 5, 2013); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Missouri v. Holland’s 
Second Holding, 73 MO. L. REV. 939 (2008); Rick Pildes, Does Congress have the Power 
to Enforce Treaties? Part I, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 14, 2013, 6:58 AM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/14/does-congress-have-the-power-to-enforce-
treaties-part-i/; Rick Pildes, Does Congress Have the Power to Enforce Treaties? Part II, 
THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 16, 2013, 10:27 AM), http://www.volokh.com/ 
2013/01/16/does-congress-have-the-power-to-enforce-treaties-part-ii/; Rick Pildes, 
Does Congress Have the Power to Enforce Treaties? Part III, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(Jan. 16, 2013, 1:16 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/21/does-congress-have-
the-power-to-enforce-treaties-part-iii/; Rick Pildes, Does Congress Have the Power to 
Enforce Treaties? Part IV, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 27, 2013, 4:15 PM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/27/does-congress-have-the-power-to-enforce-
treaties-part-iv/. 
20. Bond v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 978 (2013).
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they to learn how to persuade Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito, 
Roberts, and Kennedy, when they do not encounter a single pro-
fessor with a similar perspective? Some say that liberal profes-
sors are careful to present both sides of the argument.21 But that 
does not suffice. Unsurprisingly, the liberal version of the con-
servative argument is generally a caricature of the actual con-
servative argument. To put this point most sharply, students 
are spending more than $150,000 on their legal education, and 
they are being taught how to argue against hypothetical Repub-
licans. For that kind of money, they should at least learn to ar-
gue against real ones. 
21. Jack Goldsmith, Henry L. Shattuck Professor of Law, Harvard Law Sch.,
Remarks on Panel I: Problem: is there a lack of intellectual diversity in law school 
faculties? at the Harvard Federalist Society’s Intellectual Diversity Conference (Apr. 
5, 2013), available at http://www3.law.harvard.edu/orgs/fedsoc/intellectual-diversity-
conference/. 
